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I N

SUPREME

T H E

0 F
STATE

COURT

THE
OF

UTAH

SUSAN RACE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No.

19146

-vsROBERT WAYNE RACE,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELI.ANT

I.
NATIJRE OF THE CASE

This is a divorce action, filed on or about August 1, 1980,
fran which the appellant appeals the final Supplemental Order and
Judgpient to Decree of Divorce, dated March 16, 1983 , which made
part of said order, the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce, previously entered by the
court on December 14, 1981.

6.

the division of property of the parties, thereby materially
prejudicing the appellant.
G.

That the Divorce Decree and the property settlement

contained therein is inequitable.

IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant and respondent were husband and wife, having been
married on the 21st day of February, 1973.

At the time of the

marriage, appellant had t= minor children, namely Tamara, born
August 28, 1965, and Jeffrey, born November 13, 1970, a third
child having died on January 4, 1973.
a child, Sharon, on September 17, 1973.

The parties gave birth to
Subsequent to the

marriage, the respondent adopted the aforementioned minor
children, Tamara and Jeffrey.
A Canplaint for Divorce was filed by the appellant on or
about August 1, 1980 and the parties separated on or about
January 1, 1981, at which time the respondent moved frum the
residence of the parties.

Subsequently, the respondent was

charged by the state of Utah with the crime of incest against the
eldest daughter of the parties, Tamara, in criminal number 81 L'RS
109, for which said crime, respondent served ninety l90J days in
the Salt Lake County Jail in 1982.

9.

The minor child,

Tarr1cir.i,

·,,,.:is

placed in the custody of the Juvenile Court for the State of
Utah, case no. 343584.
In March, 1981, as a result of the appellant's discovery of
the incestu:>us relationship between respondent and the minor
child, Tamara, and the appellant's fears that respondent had
taken sexual liberties with another minor child, Sharon,
appellant moved with the minor children frcxn the hcxne of the
parties to the state of California.

See, Transcript of Trial

( 10-1-81) pages 3-5.
A hearing was held on the 30th day of April, 1981, before
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, at which time the trial court
a...arded temporary child support to the appellant in the sum of
$500.00 per month, and ordered that a child custcxly evaluation
and visitation evaluation be performed on the parties.

Various

further hearings were held by the court, which resulted in the
appellant obtaining a judgment against the respondent for
tanporary child support arrearages in the sum of $1,500.00, and
which resulted in the appellant being held in contempt of the
lower court for her failure to appear and bring the children
betore the trial court.
The first trial in the above matter came before the court on
October 1, 1981, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge presiding.
At this time, the appellant was residing in the state of
\'ashingtun with the minor children, and, due to her fears with

10.

regard to the children, the appellant did not appear at the
trial, but was represented by counsel, Lynn P. Heward.

The

respondent appeared in person and was represented by counsel,
Jimi Mitsunaga.
'Ihe issues of child custody, support, division of property
and division of debts were in issue at the time of the first
trial on the matter.

In chambers, prior to trial, appellant's

counsel moved the trial court to adnit and rule on several
Affidavits in his possession, which were made by persons that
were outside of the state of Utah and unable to attend the trial.
See, Transcript of Trial, (10-1-81) page 1, lines 18-22.

These

Affidavits were ruled inadnissible by the trial court, the lower
court stating that it

not accept the Affidavits as evidence

in the case to prove the allegations of her (appellant's)
Canplaint, nor

the court accept hearsay evidence that was

not properly acinissible under the rules.
Trial, (10-1-81) page 2, lines 15-19.

See, Transcript of

These Affidavits were

supportive of the appellant's reasons for removing the children
from the state of Utah and the appellant's reluctance to return
to the state, and went to the issues of child custody,
visitation, support and property division.
The respondent was called by appellant's counsel, and was
questioned as to what funds each party brought into the marriage

11.

and contributed to the purchase of the real property of the
parties, see, Transcript of Trial, (10-1-81) pages 18-21, the
debts incurred by the parties during the marriage and the
respondent's filing of a Chapter XIII bankruptcy, see Transcript
of Trial, (10-1-81) page 55, lines 12-25, pages 60-63.

In

addition, appellant called Dr. Lynn Anderson of the Division of
Family Services, to testify with regard to the respondent's
incestuous relations with his daughter, Tamara, see Transcript of
Trial, (10-1-81) page 33, lines 4-7, her opinion with regard to
visitation, see Transcript of Trial, (10-1-81), page 38, lines
12-15, and appellant's fitness as a parent to the children, see
Transcript of Trial (10-1-81) page 38, lines 19-24.
After consideration of the evidence, a divorce was granted
to each party, as contained in the amended Decree of Divorce.
The trial court again ordered that a custody evaluation be
performed in Utah and in the state of Washington where the
appellant was residing, but reserved any final ruling with regard
to custody, visitation, or child support.

In addition, the court

reaffirmed the appellant's judg;nent against the respondent for
$1,500.00 for child support arrearages, and granted appellant an
additional judgftlent in the sum of $166.67 for child support
arrearages, but stayed execution on the same, pending the
scheduling of a visitation program.

As child support had been

by a prior court order on August 10, 1981, the trial court

12.
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Children's Hospital and that a reasonable visitation should be
integrated into that therapy when circunstances became
appropriate in the opinion of the professionals at said
institution.

In addition, the respondent was not ordered to pay

any child support lll1til a visitation program had been developed
the respondent and the minor children, at which time the
respondent was ordered to pay the sum of $50.00 per month, per
child.

The trial court refused to hear any argunent with regard

to the question of whether the debts listed in the respondent's
bankruptcy schedule, which were ordered to be paid from the sale
of the home, were marital debts or personal debts, or whether
said obligations had been reimbursed to respondent from various
health insurance companies or respondent's 6Dployer.

In

addition, the court refused to hear any further argunent with
regard to the division of the proceeds or equity from the sale of
the home or the question of granting a homestead exemption in
favor of the appellant.

After having previously ordered that

appellant could sul::mit Interrogatories to the respondent for the
purpose of detennining the nature of the debts listed in
respondent's bankruptcy, the court upheld the respondent's
objections to said Interrogatories, holding that respondent
needn' t answer the same.

15.

v.
ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISICN AS 'ID THE
DIVISION OF AND CONSIDERATION OF THE
PROCEE:ffi FRa--1 THE SALE OF THE REAL PROPERIY

OF THE PARTIES WAS A MISAPPLICATION OF THE
LAW AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETICN
(A)

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FAILING 'ID RECOGNIZE
WHAT DEBTS THE RESPCNDENT WAS DISCHARGING IN HIS FEDERAL BANKRIJPI'CY
PROCEEDING, AND IN SUSTAINING THE
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTIONS 'ID APPELIANT' S
INTERRcx;A'IDRIES WITH RESPECT 'ID
RESPONDENT'S BANKRIJPI'CY
Subsequent to the initiation of the above divorce acticn,
the respondent filed a Chapter XIII Bankruptcy in the Federal
Bankruptcy Court.

That bankruptcy proceeding was later corwerted

into a Chapter VII Bankruptcy prior to the final divorce herein.
At the first trial on the matter on October 1, 1981, the trial
court ordered that the real property of the parties be awarded
solely to the respondent, and that the respondent receive all
title and possession thereto.

While the

court did make

that award contingent upon certain dispositions of the funds, as
previously indicated, sole title was av.iarded to respondent, who

16.

was, at that time, still in a Chapter XI II Bankruptcy.

After the

respondent converted the Chapter XIII Bankruptcy to a Chapter VII
Bankruptcy, the Federal Bankruptcy Court, Anna Drake as Trustee,
took possession of the real property of the parties and sold the
same.

As the trial court had awarded title in the respondent,

the appellant had absolutely no input nor impact on the sale, the
property going into the hands of the Bankruptcy Court, nor any
right to a homestead exanption in the Bankruptcy Court.

As far

as the Bankruptcy Court and the Trustee in Bankruptcy were
concerned, the appellant had no interest in the hane at the time,
due to the District Court's prior order awarding title to
respondent.

Obviously, this was not the case, nor was it the

intention of the trial court.

However, this turn of events

placed the appellant in an inequitable position, which could be
alleviated only by a further order of the trial court and not
through the Federal Bankruptcy Court.

Unfortunately, and to the

appellant's prejudice, the trial court failed to recognize this
issue.
At the initial trial on the matter, the respondent testified
that all of the debts listed in the bankruptcy list ot creditors
were marital debts, and testifiea that all of the debts listed in
his financial declaration, sutmitted to the court, were the same
as those listed on the bankruptcy list of creditors.

See

Transcript of Trial, (10-1-81) page 61, line 22, through page 62,

17.

1 ine 16, and page 63, lines 13-16.

Appellant 1.x:>uld ask this

Court, as it has asked the trial court, to take notice that the
debts listed on the financial declaration suhnitted by the
respondent, and the debts listed on the respondent's bankruptcy
list of creditors, are not identical.

See, Defendant's Financial

Declaration, Attachnent "B", Unsecured Debts, designated as
Exhibit 1 , and incorporated herein by reference, and see
Menorandum of Points and Authorities relevant to the hanestead
exemption, dated April 16, 1982, page 2, paragraph 10.

There are

various creditors listed on the respondent's Chapter XIII list of
creditors that were not listed on respondent's financial
declaration.

At various times during the trial and the many

hearings before the Honorable Judge Croft, the trial court and
the appellant inquired into the nature of the debts listed by the
respondent in his bankruptcy proceeding.

In fact, the trial

court ordered that further evidence should be had into the nature
of the debts, and that Interrogatories be sutinitted to discover
whether the particular debts listed were marital, individual, or
debts which occurred after the separation of the parties.

In

addition, there was evidence to the effect that many of the debts
which had been listed on the bankruptcy schedule had been debts
for which the respondent had been reimbursed, having been paid to
the resp;ndent by insurance companies and respondent's enployer,

18.

but which ranained tmpaid by the resp:indent, the resp:indent
keeping the money and not satisfying those obligations.

After

Interrogatories were subnitted by the appellant through her first
cotmsel, Lynn P. Hei.ard, and again through her second cotmsel,
Kellie F. Williams, with regard to the status, existence of, and
payments of those debts, no answers were forthcoming fran the
respondent.

The trial court, in the final hearing on February 4,

1983, washed its hands of the matter by stating that the matter
had been decided, and that the Interrogatories need not be
answered.

Again, this order came after the trial court had

specifically ordered resp:indent's cotmsel to furnish the court
with respondent's bankruptcy schedule and an audit to the court
by respective cotmsel as to the origin and/ or payment of those
debts.

See, Transcript of Hearing (8-12-82) page 11, line 25

through page 12, line 8, and pages 14-15, and Transcript of
Hearing (9-27-82) page 13, lines 6-25, and page 14, lines 1-5.
While on the one hand the trial court had recomnended and ordered
that inquiries be made into the origin of those debts and stated
that "I "-Ould say toough that if Mr. Race, after the court
proceedings, went out, and even after the separation, went out
and incurred sane additional obligations that had nothing to do
with the marriage relationship, and then included those debts in
his schedules, that they should not be considered for the
purposes of determining how much, if anything, is going to be
19.

left over to be divided" [fran the equity in the real property].
See Transcript of Hearing (8-12-22) page 11, lines 13-20.
addition, the ccurt stated that "

In

•. other than the payment of

the debts that were outstanding at the time of the separation,
Mrs. Hunter should not have to be liable for her share of any
remainder of Mr. Race's debts that were not considered to be or
cculd not be considered debts of the marriage."

See Transcript

of Hearing (8-12-82) page 10, line 22 through page 11, line 2.

As previously stated, each time

atttllipteo to discover

the status of those debts, Lhrougt, interr...igator ies and M::>tions to
Canpel, respondent refused to ccoperate, and in the end, trial
court, still being uninformed as to the status of those debts,
and not having any further evidence, found that the matter had
been decided, and that the appellant had no recourse.

See

Transcript of Hearing (2-4-83) page 8, lines 23-24.
The home of the parties was sold by the Trustee in
Bankruptcy for the sum of $110,000.00, the net amount owing to
the Trustee being $28,915.48, together with interest at the rate
of 7% per annum, payable at the rate of $192.37 per month for ten
years with a balloon payment of $24, 810. 00 due June 20 , 1992.
See, Affidavit of Anna W. Drake dated Febn..,.11

J,

Tre

actual claims filed by the respondent toLi.Llled vl4,994.0l, and
the Trustee anticipates adninistrative claims in the sum of
$5,000.00, reducing the proceeds fran the sale of the hane to,
20.

approximately, $8,921.39.

Said proceeds and possible equity to

be divided between the partif's, but be inf unavailabl( to de
is made m June 20, 1992, and

parties until the balloon
all creditors are paid.

The result of the confusion, misunderstanding, and the
failure of the appellant and the trial court to discover the
status of the debts of respondent, when they were incurred, and
whether or not they were reimbursed to respondent, prejudiced the
appellant materially.

The appellant's share in the equity of the

hane, if any becanes available, has been reduced inequitably and
unjustly.

The trial court could have alleviated the injustice of

the property division by recognizing that a portion of the
proceeds from the sale of the tia..e

we>.:>

uuc cne respondent's, but

solely the property of the a.,!Jellai.i:, ana could have created a
deference in the appellant entitling her to inrnediate payment by
the bankruptcy court of any amount found to be hers solely.

As

the court had ordered that the home was titled solely in the
respondent, however, and that all of respondent's creditors had
to be paid, the appellant remains without recourse.

Again, at

the time of the final hearing, the court was informed that, by
his order, a deference could be created in the appellant in the
eyes of the bankruptcy court.

The trial court refused to do so,

in a blatant abuse of discretion.

While in the prior hearing

held on August 12, 1982, the court hao stated ". . . the amount of

21.

mooey [from the sale of the hane] <MJUld seem to me ought to be
used to pay off the obligations that the couple owed at the time
of their separation.

\.hether or not Mr. Race has other

obligations included in his schedules, I don't know."
Transcript of Hearing (8-12-82) page 8, lines 20-24.

See
The trial

court still did not know at the final hearinp ""' FPhruary 4,
1983, ..Oen it stated that the matter had been decided.
Presently, the Trustee in Bankruptcy, Anna Drake, is
holding, and will not disperse any funds In The Matter of Robert
Wayne Race, tb. 81-01923, until the present divorce appeal has
been detenn ined by the court.

See, Affidavit of Trustee, Anna

Drake, incorporated herein by reference and designated as Exhibit
2.

The matter of the debts listed by the respondent in his

bankruptcy schedule, and the decision as to any deference to be
given to appellant is not a moot point, only one which the trial
court refused to decide.

The trial court'., vrut:<, u

carried

out, would rob appellant of be!" sh<...re of che equity in the home,
to satisfy the separate and individual debts of respondent.

22.

(B)

IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FDR THE
TRIAL COURT 'ID FAIL 'ID REcxx;NIZE APPELIANT' S
INI'EREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY AND FAILING 'ID
GFANT A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION IN HER FAVOR.
As previously stated, the trial court's decision to give

sole possession, title and ownership of the real property of the
parties to the respondent, resulted in the appellant being unable
to file a hanestead exemption with the Federal Bankruptcy Court.
The Bankruptcy Court refused to recognize any interest in the
appellant, due to the fact that title was in the respondent's
name solely.

The only recourse which appellant had was through

the trial court, which refused to grant her any relief.

While

appellant had requested that relief, and filed a M:ition and
Statement of Points and Authorities relevant to the hanestead
exemption, the court refused, time and again, to address the
issue, until the last hearing in February, 1983, at which time
the trial court stated that no homestead exemption 'M:luld be
awarded.

Again, this effectively precludes the appellant frcrn

receiving any proceeds from the sale of the real property of the
parties, despite the fact that appellant's funds brought into the
marriage were used for the dov.n paymrnt on the home, despite the
fact that the respondent, on March 9, 1981, was ordered by the
court, to

complete payment of principal, interest, tax ci11J

insurance on the residence, and failed to do so, resulting in the
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property going into the bankruptcy court, and despite the fact
that respondent refused to canply with appellant's Request for
Production of !)'.Jcunents dated January 7, 1982, requesting
docunentation of said debts, and respondent's refusal to answer
appellant's Interrogatories with regard to said debts sul:mitted
to respondent on October 21, 1982.

Sec.78-23-3 (5 of the Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended) provides as follows:

When a hanestead is conveyed by the owner of a
property, the conveyance shall not subject property
to any liens to which it wuld not be subject in the
hands of the owners; and proceeds of any sale, to the
amount of the exanption existing at the time of the
sale, shall be exempt fran levy, execution, or other
process for one year after the receipt of the proceeds
by the person entitled to the exanption.
The appellant, in the instant case, was entitled to an
exemption, and it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to
refuse her the same, after it had taken the property out of her
name and out of her hands.

(C)

THE TRIAL CDURT MISUNDERSTOOD OR MISAPPLIED THE IAW WI IB REGARD ID THE REAL
PffiPERTY OWNED IN JOINT TENANCY BY THE
PARTIES, ID THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE
OF THE APPELIAl'JT.

In the first trial on the matter and in subsequent hearings,
24.

testimony was given and argument was made as to v.hich of the
parties paid the dov.n payment on the real property.

See,

Transcript of Trial, Testimony of Respondent (10-1-81), pages
19-21, Argunent of Counsel, Transcript of Hearing (2-4-83) page
4, lines 11-17, and the custody evaluation, sub1Jitted by Ken
Hansen, Assistant Director of the South Valley Social Services,
dated January 4, 1983, Robert Race, page 3. Evidence existed
v.hich revealed that it was appellant's funds, v.hich she brought
into the marriage v.hich were used to make the dov.n payment on the
hane of the parties, said funds corning from a settlement in a
medical malpractice action brought after the death of her minor
child, Sandra.

However, the trial court stated, in no uncertain

terms, "I am not concerned about who paid for the house in this
sort of situation.

These people were married for seven or eight

years before the separation occurred."
( 10-1-81) page 77, lines 18-19.

See, Transcript of Trial

While the Utah Supreme Court has

recognized that a trial court may take many factors into
consideration in the division of property in a marital
dissolution, this Court has repeatedly recognized that twu
important factors to consider are, what each party has given up
for the marriage, and v.hat money or property each party brings
into the marriage, particularly in cases such as this, v.here the
marriage was of relatively short duration.

See, Turner v.

Turner, 649 P.2d 6, (Ut. ,1982); Mc[bnald v. Mcl:bnald, 236 P.2d
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1066 (Ut., 1951).

The tinpact upon the appellant of this judicial

misapplication and misunderstanding of the law is substantial.
This factor, as well as the trial court's misunderstanding of the
hanestead exemption in the bankruptcy court, and its failure to
consider what debts were being discharged in the Bankruptcy
Court, reduced the resulting equity, if any, with which the
parties v.uuld have to divide; the inequitable result being that
the appellant received absolutely nothing from the sale of the
residence of the parties, notwithstanding the important monetary
contribution which she made to..ard the purchase of the property,
and notwithstanding the fact that the bankruptcy was initiated
and pursued solely by the respondent.

(D)

THE EVIDENCE IN THE INSTANT CASE INDICATES
1HAT THE PROPERTY SITI'LfrlENT WAS INEQUITABIE,
AND THAT IBERE WAS A POSSIBILI1Y OF FRAUD
00 TilE APPELIANT AND TilE OOURr, AND TiiAT
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRErION FDR
THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO REax;NI ZE THE
POSSIBIE FRAUD AND INEQUITIES.
The trial court was put on notice early in the divorce
proceedings that there was a major issue to be addressed with
regard to the creditors listed in the respondent's Chapter XIII
Bankruptcy, and whether they were actually marital debts, or
whether respondent had been reimbursed for those debts.
26.

The

respondent testified in court that the debts listed on his
financial statenent, INhich he subnitted to the court, and that
the creditors listed on his Chapter XIII schedules were
identical.
13-16.

See Transcript of hearing (10-1-81) page 63, lines

A review of those docunents and appellant's statement of

points and authorities relevant to the hanestead exenption,
reveals that there was a major discrepancy, in that several
creditors are listed on the Chapter XIII schedule INhich were not
listed on the financial statement submitted by the respondent.
This, coupled with the failure of the trial court to consider the
monies INhich went to the purchase of the real property, denied
the appellant a judg}llent based on accurate information and full
disclosure relative to the merits of her position.

TI1is

possibility of fraud and this misapplication of law thwarted the
process of justice in the instant case, and in fairness and good
conscience, the judg}llent should not stand.

See, Boyce v. Boyce,

609 P. 2d 928 Utah (1980) ,in INhich the court found that the
possibility of fraud and the inopportlll1ity on the part of the
appellant to evaluate the information concerning the defendant's
financial status was "inequitable and an affront to our judicial
system," the court concluding that the trial judge had abused his
discretion in failing to grant appellant's motion to set aside
the judg}llent. Ibid. ,at p.930.
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(E)

DIVORCE DECREE AND SUPPLEMENTAL
DECREE OF DIVORCE, AND lliE PROPERTY
SITI'I..E1'IENT CONTAINED IBEREIN IS INEQUITABLE AND PUNISHES lliE APPELIANI'.
TilE

The Utah Supreme O:mrt requires that the trial court make an

equitable disposition of marital property, "so that the parties
may readjust their lives to the new situation as well as
possible."

See Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, (Utah Code

Armotated, Sec.30-3-5 (1953, as amended).

Due to the likelihood

of fraud on the appellant and the court, the failure on the part
of the trial court to allow appellant discovery of the
respondent's creditors, and the other issues which appellant has
previously discussed,

the appellant was dealt an inequitable

settlement in a proceeding whose nature is equity.

The time span

of the divorce action resulted in changes which had to be
reconsidered by the trial judge in order to make a final order on
each of the attendant divorce issues.

The piecerneal

decision-making which occurred in this case resulted in
confusion, inequities, and a failure to account for those
on-going changes, in particular, the status of the real property
and the respondent's bankruptcy proceeding.
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The appellant submits that the trial court's property
distribution was improperly influenced by the trial court's
hostility toward the appellant.

Due to the reason aforementioned

and appellant's fears with regard to her children's safety, the
appellant was not available at the time of the first trial on the
matter.

She did, lvwever, appear before the court, first on

August 12, 1982, and several times thereafter.

At various times

during the proceedings the trial court expressed its discontent
with the appellant.

See Transcript of Hearing (2-26-82), pages

87-90, in which the trial court, after being appraised of the
respondent's incestuous relations, and the possibility of other
incestu:>us acts, threatened the appellant with the prospect of
his awarding custody of the children to the respondent.

This

attitude came about due to appellant's reluctance to allow
visitation between the minor children and the respondent.

This

judicial attitude seaned to carry over into the questions
concerning the division of property and division of the equity
fran the sale of the real property.

The trial court even refused

appellant's request that her maiden name be restored.

See,

Transcript of Hearing (2-26-82) p.96 lines 6-14.
In Reed v. Reed, 594 P.2d

871 (Utah 1979), this Court held

that while the trial court may exercise broad discretion and
consider many factors in making a property distribution, the
purpose of the settlanent should not be to punish the cdrties.
29.

See, also, English v. English, 565 P.2d 400 (Utah 1977)and !iilrn
v. Wilson, 296 P.2d 977 (Utah 1956).

In the instant case, the

appellant's property settlement is highly inequitable, and serves
to punish the appellant rather than allow her to readjust her
life to the new situation.

Point II.

TifE DF.cISION OF TifE TRIAL COURT WITH

REGARD ID VISITATION AND CHILD SUPPORT,
IS NOT IN TifE BEST INTEREST OF TifE CHILDREN,
AND CONSTITUTES AN ABIBE OF DISCRETION.

(A)

1HE TRIAL COURT ABIBED ITS DISCRETION
IN MAKING TifE RESPONDENT'S CHILD
SUPPORT OBUGATIONS CDNTINGENT UPON
HIS VISITATION WITH TifE MINOR CHILDREN.
It has often been expressed by this Court and the
Legislature that in child support and visitation matters the
trial court must consider the best interest of the children.
"The right of a child to support is a paramount right which it
possesses quite apart from any consideration relating to the
conduct of the parties."

Earl v. Earl, 17 Utah 2d 156, 406 P.2d

302 (1965), at 303; Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 30-3-10 (1953, as
30.

amended).
his child."
amended).

Utah law also provides that "every man shall support
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-43-3 (1953, as
This statute is unqualified and requires support

regardless of whether or not the non-custodial parent is
exercising visitation with the children.
While it is true that this court has allowed support
payments be conditioned upon visitation, it has done so only with
reluctance.

See, Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1302 (Utah, 1980).

Appellant sulxnits that such an order is appropriate only in
instances in which the custodial parent is purposely and
unreasonably withholding visitation and is independently wealthy
and able to support the children without assistance.
not the circunstances of the instant case.

Such are

The parties' children

have not received support fran the respondent since August 1,
1981, even when specifically ordered by the court.
reflects that after the appellant returned

ID

The record

Utah, she attenpted

to allow visitation on a supervised basis, which visitation was
withdrawn voluntarily by the respondent.

See, custody evaluation

of Ken Hansen, Assistant Director, South Valley Social Services,
Race v. Race, p.4.
Far from being in the best interests of the minor children
to this action, the orders of the trial court which condition the
appellant's receipt of any child support upon the respondent
31.

visiting with the minor children of the parties, are damaging and
act as punishment.

Simultaneously, the trial court ordered that

the appellant's judg)llent for child support arrearages in the sum
of $1,666.67 be stayed and execution on the same be stayed until
visitation was established between respondent and the minor
children, Sharon and Jeffrey.

The needs of the children being

the primary concern, ordering support conditioned on visitatiai,
and staying execution on previously-awarded judgments is counter
to the best interests of the children and in direct contradiction
of both legislative and judicial intent.

(B)

THE TRIAL CDURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN ORDERING TIIAT VISITATICN BE ESTABLISHED
BITWEEN THE RESroNDENT AND 'lliE MINOR Q-IILDREN
OF 'lliE PARTIES AS sro-i AS rosSIBLE, AND
ORDERING PRIWRY Q-IILDREN'S HOSPITAL ID
INTEGRATE THE RESPONDENT IN1D THERAPY OF
THE MINOR Q-IILDREN.
At the time when the trial court entered its final order on
February 4, 1983, the court had in its possession a child custody
evaluation which had been accomplished and sul:xnitted by the
Division of Fanily Services for the state of Utah.

Within said

evaluation, the evaluators recommended that the children not be
allowed to visit the respondent in the near future, giving their
observations and basis for the recommendations within said

report.

The trial court was aware, also, that the respondent had

been charged and served a tenn of imprisornnent for the offense of
incest with his minor daughter, Tamara, and that there was a
possibility of other incestuous acts on the part of respondent
with the minor child, Sharon.

In addition, prior to the first

trial on the matter, in chambers, the trial court was tendered
Affidavits and reports of events and discussions involving the
minor children of the parties, which had been prepared and
sul::mitted by persons living out of the state of Utah, and
unavailable for trial.

as previously discussed in the

Statenent of Facts, the court found these Affidavits and reports
to be hearsay and refused their admission.
Due to the highly equitable nature of proceedings involving

minor children, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the trial
court is granted much more latitude in the adnission of evidence
in such proceedings.

See, State in the Interest of K.D.S.1

578 P .2d 9 (Utah 19 78).

In addition, while the pertinent

statute is within the chapter of Juvenile Courts, Sec.
78-3(a)-35, certainly indicates a legislative intent with regard
to the admission of evidence in proceedings involving children.
That section states:

"For the purpose of detennining proper disposition of the child, and for the purpose of
establishing the fact of neglect or dtependency,
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written reports and other material relating to the
child's mental, physical and social history and condition, may be received in evidence, and may be
considered by
court along with the other
evidence •••
The affidavits which the trial court found to be
inadmissible, appellant subnits. would have been valuable to the
trial court on the issue of custody and visitation.
Nevertheless, after considering all of the evidence, and without
personally observing the minor children. the trial court ordered
that the minor children of the parties, Jeffrey and Sharon,
continue with therapy through Primary Children's Hospital, and
that said hospital should integrate the respondent into the
children's rherapy when the circunstances were deemed appropriate
in the opinion of the professionals.

There, the court indicated

a number of times its desire that visitation be established as
soon as possible.

This order is in direct contradiction to the

recCJ!IIlTiendations made by Utah Social Services in the custody
evaluation, the history of the respondent, and the information
which the trial court had before it.

The foregoing facts,

together with the apparent reluctance of the trial court to
confront the incest issue, and its physical as well as
psychological effect on the minor children of the parties,
resulted in an order which does not serve the best interests of
the minor children, Jeffrey and Sharon, and is an abuse of
discretion.
34.

Point Ill.
THE TRIAL CXJURI' ABUSED ITS DISCRF.:TION IN
All.OWING THE CXJNTEMPT OF THE APPELIJ\NT
'ID REMA.IN IN THE CXJURI' RECXJRD.

As evidenced through:mt the transcripts of the various

trials and hearings in the above matter, the trial court was
disgruntled with the appellant, and the appellant's actions.
Adnittedly, it

have been in the best interests of the

appellant, had she appeared personally at the first trial in this
matter.

However, the protection of her children and her fears of

injury to them were paramount at that time.

With the confirmed

evidence of incest before the court, and the possibility of other
incestuous acts, the court stated "

•• she certainly has been

totally uncooperative, and she is still in trouble with this
court and going to be in further trouble if we don't get this
thing resolved and the court orders [with regard to visitation]
canplied with."
lines 10-13.

See, Transcript of Hearing (2-26-82) page 90,

The court further stating, "she may have to sit out

ten days in jail to find out what that contempt of court means."
See, Transcript of Trial (2-26-82) page 91, lines 3-4.

And, with

no evidence before the court, the trial court made
unsubstantiated statenents with regard to the appellant poisoning
the minor child's mind with regard to her father.
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See,

Transcript of Trial (2-26-82) page 90, lines 21-25.

As stated

earlier, the court continually threatened the appellant with the
statenent that if she did not cooperate with regard to
visitation, he wuld give custody of the minor children to the
respondent.

See, Transcript of Hearing (2-26-82) pages 87-89.

After the trial court found the appellant in contempt, the
appellant appeared before the trial court m.unerous times and
attempted to establish supervised visitation between the children
and respondent, which was voluntarily stopped by the respondent.
'Ihese acts, as well as the appellant's understandable parental
concern, certainly purged appellant of any earlier contenpt of
court.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion , the property settlement in the instant case

is wholly inequitable, based upon a misapplication of the law of
marital property settlement, and a total ignorance as to the
respondent's financial status, debts, and bankruptcy proceeding.
Due to the possible fraud on the part of the respondent, the
piecemeal decision-making, and the failure to account for ongoing
changes in the status of the real property of the parties and the
respondent's bankruptcy proceeding, the appellant has been
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prejudiced, substantially and llllfairly.

The trial court's final orders with regard to the issues of
child support and visitation are contraindicated by all of the
evidence presented to the court.

Due to that evidence of incest,

the respondent's vollllltary cessation of visitation, and the needs
of the minor children, the orders linking child support to
visitation and ordering visitation as soon as possible are not in
the best interests of the minor children, and, therefore, an
abuse of discretion.
In addition, to allow the contempt of the appellant to
ranain in the court record, after numerous atternpts on her part
to purge herself of that court order, and after the court was
presented with substantial justification for the acts of the
appellant in her failure to appear before the trial court with
the minor children, punishes the appellant, and is an abuse of
discretion.
While the trial court is presented with a difficult and
disturbing decision in any contested divorce dissolution, it is
an abuse of discretion for the trial court, in the instant case,
to fail to recognize the incest present in this m2tter, and its
attendant affects upon the children and the parties, it is an
abuse of discretion to fail

to

recognize whcit pruperty the

parties brought li1to the marriage .md v.hu omtc ibulc'<i

37.

whdl tu Lhc•

purchase of the real property of the parties; it is an abuse of
discretion to make an award of property or division of equity in
real property when there is no knowledge as to what debts are
being paid from the proceeds of the sale of the home of the
parties; and it is an abuse of discretion to fail to grant child
support to the minor children of the parties when it is the acts
of the respondent which initially created the problans and
dilenrna confronting the appellant and the minor children.
The foregoing argunents presented by appellant and the
Transcript on file herein, demonstrate that the appellant is
entitled to a reversal of the judgment below and a determination
of the attendant issues.

If this Court fails to act in

appellant's favor, she will be precluded fran any money award,
deference, or exemption from the sale of the real property of the
parties and she will be precluded fran receiving child support
from the respondent.

The 101-.er court orders, if upheld, will

serve to satisfy the separate and individual debts, needs and
=issions of the respondent while serving to punish the minor
children and the appellant.

KELLIE F. WillIAMS

Attorney for Appellant
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KELLIE F. WULIAMS
Attorney for Petitioner
SUSAN RACE HUNTER
CORPORON & WIILIAMS
142 East 200 South, Ste 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801) 328-1162

IN 1HE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, FOR 1HE

DISTRICT OF IJI'AH,

CENfRAL

DIVISION.

AFFIDAVIT OF TRUSTEE,

IN 1HE MATIER OF

ANNA DRAKE.

ROBERT WAYNE RACE.

00. 81-01923

STATE OF IJI'AH

COUNTY OF SALT I.ARE

SS,

CDME.S N'.)W, ANNA DRAKE, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, and de[X)ses and
states as follows:

1.

That she has been and is the Trustee in Bankruptcy in the

above-entitled matter.

2.

That she will not disburse any funds in this case until the

Bankrupt's divorce appeal, Case No.19146, has been detemined by the
Supreme Court of Utah.

DATED this JJ..:!±___day of July, 1983.
ANNA DRAKE

£xJ;16d 2

p I

40

SUBSC1UBED AND SWORN to before me this

__d_day

of July, 1983.

NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in

Salt Lake County, Utah.

My COlllllission Expires:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

MAILED a copy of the foregoing APPEUJ..NI''S BRIEF as follows:
J:IMI MITSUNAGA, ESQ.

731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

84021

LYNN P . HEWARD

Fonner Attorney for
Plaintiff and Appellant
1174 East 2700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

this 10th day of Novenber, 1983.

,-------·

6u l Ci !; /dt. [_,__=---:,
IE F. Will :u;i;lS
Attorney for Appellant
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